Handle Hazardous Waste safely.pdf

February 10, 2019 | Author: Arunkumar | Category: Hazardous Waste, Incineration, Waste, Combustion, Fires
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Handle Hazardous Waste Safely Delmar R. Morrison, III, P.E. Michael C. Stern, P.E. Carmen H. Osorio-Amado Exponent, Inc.

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Hazardous-waste disposal presents unique challenges. An analysis of several incidents highlights the importance of properly characterizing waste prior to processing.

he chemical process industries (CPI) inevitably  produce  produce waste. waste. Although Although minimi minimizatio zation n efforts efforts are essential, waste is still generated and must be safely disposed. The chemicals involved in the front end of manufacturing processes are typically well-dened, includ ing their hazardous properties and potential interactions. In contrast, waste streams are often ill-dened, which makes identifying hazards and preventing incidents challenging. The CPI have increasingly adopted process safety management (PSM) principles for handling hazardous chemicals in the past decades. This cultural evolution has been driven, in part, by major accidents. PSM is more complex when applied to waste composed of unknown, mixed, and unconuncon trolled chemicals.

This article provides some background on wastehandling fundamentals and analyzes several res and explo sions at waste-handling facilities. Despite the signicant differences among these incidents, they can all be attributed to a gap between the real and recognized properties of the wastes.

The basics

Title 29 Part 1910.119 of the U.S. Code Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) details process safety management principles for highly hazardous chemicals. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) expands on this process safety model and denes 20 elements of risk-based process safety (1). (1). It is good practice to apply these management principles to waste handling and treatment, which requires appropriately Table 1. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (E PA PA)) provides characterizing the waste. However, rather than holisticriteria for characterizing hazardous waste. cally applying PSM principals, hazardous-waste hanCharacteristic Criteria Regulation dling facilities typically follow a prescriptive approach to characterize and handle waste based on U.S. EnviIgn Ignita itabili bilitty Liqui iquid d with with a flashp ashpoi oint nt less less 40 CFR §261.21 ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) (EPA) regulations, such than 60°C (140°F) as those under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Ignitable solid as determined by Method 1030 Act (RCRA) (Title 40 CFR Parts 239–282). Oxidizing solid as determined The EPA reported that 26,237 operations produced by Method 1040 33.6 million tons of hazardous waste in 2015, of which, Spontaneously combustible over 6 million tons were non-wastewater (2). (2). Hazardous as determined by Method 1050 waste, as dened in RCRA, must be managed to meet a Corrosivity pH le less th than or or eq equal to to 2, 2, 40 CFR §261.22 variety of criteria related to its nal form and potential or greater than or equal to 12.5, hazards. Determining the chemical properties of waste and/or corrosive to steel can be challenging, because streams might consist of as determined by Method 1110A  separate phases or reacting or changing components, Reactivity Unstable under normal co condi40 CFR §261.23 and might be ill-dened by the waste generator. generator. Because tions and/or reactive with water it is difcult to identify the properties and hazards of Toxicity Toxic as defined by Method 1311 40 CFR §261.24 waste streams, managing waste hazards is inherently

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Copyright © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)

Is combustion with air the Is internal chemistry Yes more challenging than managing typical only chemistry intended at your facility? performed at your facility? chemical process hazards. No No Industrial waste may pass through Yes Is there any mixing or combining of different substances? a municipal waste transfer station en Yes route to a landll or be collected, aggreaggre Is any heat generated during the mixing Yes No gated, and incinerated by a permitted or physical processing of substances? Y es Does any other physical processing of substances occur at your facility? hazardous-waste treatment, storage, and No No disposal facility (TSDF), depending Is any substance identified as Y es Yes  Are there any hazardous substances on the source, industry, and regulatory spontaneously combustible? stored or handled at your facility? No classication of the waste stream. Facil Yes No Is any substance identified as peroxide-forming? ities may not be equipped to handle the No complexity and unknown hazards of Yes Expect Is any substance identified as water-reactive? some wastes. Chemical chemical reactivity  Evaluating  Evaluating chemical chemical reactiv reactivity ity reactivity No Yes hazard(s) hazard(s) hazards. Hazardous waste may Is any substance identified as an oxidizer? are not likely  be ammabl ammable, e, corrosiv corrosive, e, reactive reactive,, No Yes and/or toxic. The RCRA regulations Is any substance identified as self-reactive? Polymerization (40 CFR Part 261) detail the criteria Decomposing No Rearranging Yes No Can incompatible materials coming into contact that dene whether a waste is hazardhazard cause undesired concequences? ous based on characteristics such as ignitability, corrosivity, and toxicity. The 1. This decision tree can help you to determine if a chemical reactivity hazard is likely. p Figure 1. This EPA does not currently provide a test method for assessing reactivity. Table 1 Develop/document system to manage chemical reactivity hazards includes a partial list of criteria for characterizing hazardous wastes. There are many exceptions and Collect reactivity Review, audit, manage Investigate details not fully covered in Table 1 that can be hazard information change, improve hazard chemical found in 40 CFR Part 261. management reactivity practices/program incidents Facilities that generate hazardous waste are Identify chemical reactivity hazards required to classify the waste before sending it Implement to a TSDF. After After it receives the waste, the TSDF Test for chemical must perform a preacceptance analysis to conrm reactivity Communicate and train on the characteristics and identify incompatible chemical reactivity wastes (3). (3). Depending on the processes employed  by the TSDF, TSDF, chemica chemicals ls may may be mixed mixed or or packed packed Document chemical  Asscess chemical Identify process control and together during processing or shipping. Chemireactivity risks and reactivity risks risk management options management decisions cals that are incompatible might react and generate heat or produce ammable, toxic, or inert 2. If a chemical reactivity hazard is likely, follow these steps to develop and p Figure 2. If gases or mixtures that produce toxic substances, document a system to manage the hazard. res, or explosions. According to the EPA, EPA, compatibility testing may include  be conduct conducted ed on an ongoing ongoing basis, basis, particul particularly arly if if the process process determining water reactivity (e.g., ( e.g., foaming,  foaming, heat generation, or processing conditions change or a new chemical is introexplosivity), oxidation-reduction potential, and cyanide and duced into the source process. If a chemical reactivity hazard sulde content, among others. Waste Waste compatibility can be is expected, CCPS also suggests implementing a chemical evaluated by physical tests or based on known properties of reactivity management program (Figure 2). each of the streams constituents. If waste streams are being  Protocol  Protocolss for invest investigati igating ng react reactive ive chemi chemical cal inciden incidents. ts. checked for compatibility using known information about Two resources for performing incident investigations are the streams’ constituents, constituents, a certain level of condence in the the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) (NFPA) 921 Guide for compositions of the waste streams is necessary to evaluate Fire and Explosion Investigations , 2017 edition, and the  potential  potential reaction reaction consequenc consequences. es. CCPS book Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process CCPS published a preliminary screening approach based  Incidents,  Incidents, second  second edition (5, 6). 6). These resources outline the on a series of questions to help facilities decide if a chemical scientic method, investigation techniques, and fundamenfundamencan pose a reactivity hazard (Figure 1) (4). (4). Screening should tals of res, explosions, and reactive chemical incidents.

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Because res and explosions, as well as the associated emergency response, often destroy essential evidence needed for an investigation, conclusively determining the chemistry and causes may be impossible. Thus, investigators must rely on the scientic method to develop hypothetical causes, test those causes, and determine the most likely causes and contributing factors.

Treatment, Tr eatment, storage, and disposal facilities The ultimate fate of hazardous materials is often destruction by incineration. TSDFs commonly repackage wastes, either by combining similar waste streams in the same container or by breaking up large containers into smaller containers. Thus, hazardous materials often pass through the following stages at a TSDF: 1. receipt and characterization characterization 2. temporary temporary storage storage 3. repackaging, either bulking up or breaking breaking down 4. storage storage awaiting awaiting disposal 5. nal disposal. disposal. TSDFs typically sample and perform basic characterization of wastes as they are received. However, this  process  process is imper imperfect. fect. It is not guarant guaranteed eed that that sample sampless from distinct locations in a waste container represent the bulk of the waste in the container or shipment. The potential for deviations from actual properties increases signicantly for larger containers (e.g., ( e.g., a  a 1-m3 box) and large volumes of wastes that are not completely sampled (e.g., (e.g., only  only a subset of the containers are sampled), as well as wastes that are heterogeneous (e.g., (e.g., layered,  layered, contain pockets of different compositions). Incident investigation at TSDFs can be very challenging. A TSDF storage area may contain thousands of individual waste containers (Figure 3). A re or explosion in the storage area can destroy or damage the waste containers, displace containers, and mix residues from adjacent containers. This

Figure 3. This 3. This treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) contains thousands of storage vessels. p

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makes it difcult to determine the cause. The likelihood of determining the actual cause typically increases if the incipient stages of the re or explosion are witnessed.

Fires and explosions in storage operations A re occurred in a small TSDF storage bay. The facilfacil ity handled a wide variety of wastes, including ammable materials and acids. The facility layout included storage  bays, laborator laboratories, ies, treatm treatment ent equipm equipment, ent, and and ofce ofce areas. areas. Intermediate bulk containers (IBCs) and sets of four 55-gal drums were placed on wooden pallets and stacked two or three levels high in the storage bay (Figure 4). According to witness statements, the re in the storage  bay was was precede preceded d by a loud hissing hissing sound and a pressurpressurized release of a reddish dust/mist from a container near the center row of the containers in Figure 4. The witness did not see the exact container from which the release originated,  but was was able able to estimate estimate its its approxim approximate ate locat location ion within within a few pallet stacks. After the re started, re suppression efforts were able to contain the re damage to the storage  bay where where it origina originated. ted. The investigation focused on the adjacent rows containing the waste drums that were damaged. Investigators reconstructed the exact location of each waste container in the neighboring pallet stacks based on storage records, remaining containers, damage patterns, and witness statements about container placement. They conrmed the origin to be one pallet stack in the center row. The containers in the center row had not been repack aged or disturbed from the time of receipt until the incident. Therefore, the investigation could refute commingling of incompatible wastes or mixing of a reactive pocket within the source drum as potential causes. Delayed decomposition of waste material in one of the drums was determined to be the likely source of the prespres surization. The pressure eventually increased until the source

Figure 4. After 4. After a fire occurred in a storage bay, investigators were able to determine that the release came from the middle row of containers. p

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container ruptured and the re ensued. There was signicant uncertainty about the exact contents of each container; thus, a specic container could not be identied as the origin of the release. The extent of damage does not always preclude determination of the likely cause of a re during storage. A similar similar TSDF had a re in a storage bay that consumed all of the hazardous waste and combustible containers in the area (Figure 5), but investigators were able to precisely place the origin of the re. A nearby operator saw that the re began at ground level at a specic pallet stack. The source of the re was most likely a leak of fuming red nitric acid that spilled onto the wooden pallet holding the drums. Fuming nitric acid is a strong acid capable of igniting wood. The facility had not identied the potential consequences of an acid spill; thus, responsible parties did not select a noncombustible pallet material (e.g., (e.g., steel).  steel). A re at a different hazardous-waste TSDF destroyed the facility (Figure 6). The initial cause, however, could not be determined. The magnitude of the incident forced thousands of local residents to be evacuated over two days. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigated the incident and identied several potential causes (7). (7). Witnesses reported a strong chlorine odor and smoke  plume,  plume, and the the rst rst reghter reghterss on the the scene scene reporte reported d a small small re. The re started in one of the hazardous-waste storage  bays and and rapidly rapidly spread spread to other other locations locations in in the facility facility,, including a bay containing many 55-gal drums of amam mable solvents. The incident investigation revealed that the re originated in a storage bay where containers of solid chlorine-containing pool chemicals and unspent aircraft oxygen generators were awaiting nal disposal. Witness observations of a chlorine odor and smoke likely indicate that these chemicals were present near the re origin. Investigators, however, were not able to denitively

5. Despite p Figure 5. Despite

extensive damage to this storage facility, investigators were able to pinpoint the origin of the release because of witness statements.

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conclude that these chemicals were the cause of the re due to the extent of the damage. The CSB investigation ndings focused on chemical oxygen generators (8). (8). The CSB concluded that chemical oxygen generators most likely contributed to the intensica tion of the re, which quickly spread to an adjacent stor age bay of ammable materials. The CSB recommended that unspent oxygen generators should be actuated before transportation. Many incidents have occurred involving storage of chlorine-containing chlorine-containing pool chemicals (Refs. 9–12 offer examples).

Fires and explosions during incineration Hazardous wastes with an intrinsic heat of combustion are often incinerated in furnaces, boiler combustion chambers, rotary kilns, or other combustion equipment as supplementary fuels. Fuel containers and liquid feeds may  be mixed mixed or provided provided in in separate separate container containerss to achiev achievee target target average heats of combustion and emissions. The use of wastes as fuels has been associated with incidents outside of the actual combustion equipment. An explosion occurred at an incineration facility that  processed  processed hazar hazardous dous and and nonhazar nonhazardous dous solid solid and and liquid liquid wastes through thermal destruction in a rotary kiln. Drums of waste were homogenized in a shredder prior to being fed to the kiln. Due to the potentially ammable nature of the waste and the likelihood that the shredder would gener ate mechanical sparks and/or heat, the system was inerted with nitrogen gas. The nitrogen inerting function was performed over a xed time period. The system automatically moved individual pallets of waste into an airlock, purged the airlock with nitrogen, and then dumped the pallets into the shredder chamber, which had already been inerted with nitrogen. After shredding, a screw conveyor moved the

Figure 6. The 6. The release at this TSDF destroyed the facility and forced residents nearby to evacuate. p

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homogenized waste to the rotary kiln. A central incinerator control room at the facility monitored several operating parameters, including the oxygen concentration and temperature within the inerted equipment. Since one of the primary safety mechanisms for the unit was a low-oxygen-concentration atmosphere, the shredder was not intended for oxidizing materials, such as solid oxidizers, oxygen containers/cylinders, explosives, and/or materials that react with water. During shredding of one waste load, an explosion occurred in the shredder chamber, which damaged the unit and opened explosion panels on the shredder chamber and airlock. Figure 7 shows oxygen concentration trends inside the airlock and shredder, as well as the temperature in the shredder chamber. chamber. On the night of the incident, a waste load was fed into the unit, indicated by the peak in oxygen at  –2.5 min. min. After nitrogen nitrogen purgin purging, g, the load was transfe transferred rred to the shredder and shredding commenced. Approximately Approximately one minute after shredding began, the oxygen concentration started to increase, from 2% to more than 13% over a period of 20 sec. According to the recorded data, the temperature in the shredder chamber suddenly increased at approximately the same time as the increase in oxygen concentration. This temperature increase is consistent with the heat generated by the combustion explosion in the shredder chamber. An engineering investigation concluded that the source of the rapid oxygen inux was an item in the waste stream that released oxygen when it was shredded, most likely a small pressur ized cylinder. All potential sources of air via external sources were examined and rejected as causes. The explosion in the shredding system demonstrates the serious consequences of processing waste with unintended  properties  properties.. In this this case, case, a system system that was intend intended ed to operate operate 16

120

Shredder Chamber O2 Concentration

14

115

   %12  ,   n   o    i    t 10   a   r    t   n   e 8   c   n   o    C   n 6   e   g   y   x 4    O

110  Airlock O2 Concentration

105    F    °  ,   e   r   u 100    t   a   r   e   p 95   m   e    T 90

Temp mpera eratur ture e

85

2 0 –4

80 –3

–2

–1

0 1 Time, min

2

3

4

5

Figure 7. The 7. The temperature in the shredder chamber suddenly increased at approximately the same time as an increase in oxygen concentration, which suggests a combustion reaction occurred in the chamber. p

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while inerted inadvertently contained compressed oxygen, resulting in the explosion. Although the waste was screened  before  before it was fed fed into into the shredder shredder,, the scree screening ning proces processs did not identify and divert the oxygen-containing waste. The explosion mitigation system functioned correctly by relieving the explosion pressure through explosion vents. The system was damaged, but the damage was not catastrophic, and there were no injuries. Another incident involved the explosion of a tank car containing toluene diisocyanate (TDI) waste material that was used as supplementary fuel in a rotary kiln at a cement  plant operating operating as a hazard hazardous ous waste waste TSDF TSDF.. The The incident incident occurred when a rail tank car exploded in the unloading area and was propelled about 750 ft away (13–15). (13–15). Other tank cars, as well as storage tanks located nearby, were also heavily damaged. No injuries or fatalities were reported; however, property loss was signicant. This facility received several tank cars containing column bottoms waste from a TDI manufacturing process. TDI is a monomer feedstock used to manufacture polyurethane polymers. The waste generator had stored tank cars containing this type of waste material for several years, and reprocessed them as the opportunity arose. Prior to the incident, several tank cars of TDI material had been shipped to the TSDF for incineration, and were successfully emptied and the contents incinerated in the kilns. The TDI waste was partially polymerized in most tank cars. The investigainvestiga tion determined, however, that the contents of the tank car involved in the incident were heterogeneous and their properties were not the same as those of the previous batches. The facility used external steam heating via built-in steam jackets on the tank cars to reduce the viscosity of the  polymerize  polymerized d TDI TDI to enable enable transfer transfer into into the the kilns. kilns. Two Two days days  before  before the incident, incident, the the facili facility ty made made three three unsucc unsuccessful essful attempts to unload the contents from the tank, twice attemptattempt ing to heat the TDI material. The shipment was rejected after the unsuccessful attempts at unloading, but the tank car was left in the unloading area until the explosion. Samples of the original material and residue ejected during the incident revealed the presence of self-polymerized TDI, TDI monomer, and ureas. However, thermal analysis of the materials indicated that the polymerized TDI and TDI monomer had a thermal-runaway onset temperature that was much higher than possible with the steam heating system. A chemical hazard assessment revealed that the cause of the explosion was the runaway thermal decomposition of a contaminant mixed with the TDI waste. The TSDF operator relied on the waste generator for information regarding the waste composition and safe heating procedures. In this case, the waste generator supplied incomplete waste characterization data and inadequate instructions and warnings for heating and handling the TDI waste.

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Fires at a municipal solid waste transfer facility A rural municipal solid waste (MSW) facility was tempo rarily storing and sorting municipal and industrial waste prior to transfer to a landll. During this time, two res occurred in a three-day period. The rst involved a trailer of waste awaiting transfer to the landll, and the second involved a different trailer and a large portion of a building containing waste. After the rst re, the facility did not conduct a formal investigation, and relied on supposition and poor science to conclude that the incorrect waste stream was the cause. The incorrect conclusion was adopted by the facility and the real cause went unaddressed. The facility operators commingled different materials,  both in in piles piles and and in open open trailer trailerss located located in loading loading bays, and and the commingled waste was periodically hauled to a munici pal landl landll. l. The The facility facility did not not accept accept RCRA RCRA hazardous hazardous waste or liquid wastes. The local regulations and the permit for the facility both acknowledged the reasonable possibility of hot loads, i.e., waste i.e., waste materials that undergo self-heating or are already smoldering. The rst re involved the contents and the rear of the trailer (Figure 8), which was located in a loading bay overnight. The trailer contained a mixture of bottom ash from a uidized-bed coal combustor and other unknown MSW and construction debris. The facility moved the burning trailer away from the building, allowing it to extinguish on its own. Witness statements indicated that it burned for the next several days. The re damage patterns on the trailer were consistent with a re originating at the rear wheels, perhaps due to overheated brakes. Three days after the rst re, a second re was discovdiscov ered in a different trailer loaded with similar waste. The trailer was held overnight in the same loading bay as the rst trailer. trailer. This re, however, destroyed the adjoining building. An early investigation of the second re concluded that the combustor bottom ash was incorrectly described as agricultural lime, a term that is commonly used to describe

8. The fire originated in the rear of the trailer, possibly due to p Figure 8. The overheated breaks.

 products  products that that contai contain n calcium calcium carbonate carbonate (CaCO3), calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)2), or calcium oxide (CaO). Instead, the site concluded that the waste was the equivalent of pure lime or quick lime (CaO), which they suspected underwent exoexo thermic hydration, and the heat of that reaction started both res. CaO should be classied as a RCRA hazardous waste. The initial investigation concluded that the mischaractermischaracterization was the direct cause of the rst re. The engineering investigation conducted after the second re analyzed that conclusion and also identied several potential causes of the res, including an electrical re, spontaneous combustion of MSW, MSW, and rekindling of the smoldering remains of the rst re (the trailer was close to the area where the rst re occurred). Chemical analysis of the combustor bottom ash and a review of the literature (16) literature  (16) indicated  indicated that the ash did not contain sufcient CaO to cause spontaneous combuscombustion through hydration. Further, the waste was not a RCRA hazardous waste as dened by the federal hazardous-waste regulation 40 CFR 261.4(b). The incorrect conclusion that the ash waste was CaO and that its exothermic hydration started the res highlights the importance of precisely describing waste streams — even if the streams are not covered by the RCRA regulation — as well as the value of a systematic scientic investigation.

DELMAR R. MORRISON, III, PhD, P.E.,  is a principal engineer in the thermal science division of Exponent, Inc. (Email: [email protected]), where he consults in the areas of product safety, product liability, and process safety, as well as hazard and risk analysis, failure analysis, and incident investigation. He specializes in evaluations of origin, cause, and engineering issues related to catastrophic incidents involving fires, explosions, and chemical process technology. Morrison’s practical research involves self-heating materials and reactive chemical hazards, as well as scenarios such as spontaneous ignition of vegetableoil-contaminated oil-contaminated fabrics and self-heating of reactive chemicals. He received a BA in chemistry from Knox College, an MS in chemical engineering from Oklahoma State Univ., and a PhD in chemical engineering from Illinois Institute of Technology. MICHAEL C. STERN, PhD, P.E., P.E., is a managing engineer in the thermal science division of Exponent, Inc., where he consults in the areas of industrial and chemical processing, process safety, product safety, failure analysis, and incident investigation. He specializes in the areas of chemical separations, fire and explosion investigation and prevention, reactive materials, and electrochemical systems including batteries. Stern’s ongoing research includes investigating the competency of ignition sources in industrial flash fires, combustible dust hazards, and mechanisms for electrical fires. He received a BS in chemical engineering from Lehigh Univ. and an MS in chemical engineering practice and a PhD in chemical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. CARMEN H. OSORIO-AMADO, PhD,  is an associate in the thermal science division at Exponent, Inc., where she consults on hazardous incidents such as fires, explosions, and leaks of flammable and toxic materials. She previously worked at BP America as a process safety engineer, supporting day-to-day offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico. Osorio worked on various elements of process safety management standards, including process safety information, management of change (MOC), and process hazard analysis (PHA), as well as regulatory compliance. She received a BS in chemical engineering from the Univ. Industrial of Santander, Columbia, and a PhD in material science and engineering from Texas A&M Univ.

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 Additional thoughts As these incidents illustrate, investigating the cause of an accident involving hazardous waste is challenging. Figure 9  provides  provides guidel guidelines ines for for investig investigating ating suspected suspected waste streams and their role in initiating a re or explosion. Many of the accidents detailed here were caused by chemical reactions followed by a release of heat or pressure that caused a storage vessel to fail. While accurate waste characterization, characterization, adequate waste labeling, and suitable pack pack aging materials are signicant preventive safeguards against these types of failures, it may not always be possible to determine whether a waste stream is completely stable based on testing. Therefore, facilities may still need to consider the impact of a ammable vapor release or an exothermic and/or pressure-generating reaction within waste streams. Companies should consider thoughtful facility siting ( e.g., using hazardous area classications, adequate distance or  barriers  barriers between between waste streams), streams), re re protectio protection n systems systems (i.e., (i.e., ame and gas detectors), and limiting storage time prior to processing. Oxidizers may also be involved in initiating or increasing the severity of incidents. Inerting atmospheres may be an effective and robust protective measure in many process operations; however, due to the potential for oxidizer ingress in misidentied waste, additional protections such as exploexplosion vents may be required. Training is also a vital protection against accidents, not

only for TSDF personnel but also the waste generator’s  personnel.  personnel. Training Training should address address the fundament fundamental al technitechnical concepts associated with hazardous-waste materials, enabling waste coordinators to successfully implement CEP RCRA and PSM requirements at their facilities. Was the waste characterized for the hazard?

No

Yes Could the waste have contained multiple phases or layers? No

Chemical reactivity hazard may have been present No

Yes

Was each phase characterized?

Yes

Was the waste able to dry, absorb moisture, or oxidize in air?

Yes

No Was the waste stored for an extended period of time or stored at very hot or very cold temperatures?

Yes

No  Are chemical reactivity hazards to be expected according to the CCPS preliminary screening test?

Yes No

Waste was unlikely to have initiated the chemical incident

Figure 9. Use 9. Use this decision tree to aid investigations of incidents that may involve hazardous waste. p

Literature Cited 1.

Center for Chemical Process Safety, “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety,” CCPS, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ (2007).

2.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “2015 Biennial Report Summary,” http://rcrainfo.epa.gov/rcrainfoweb/action/modules/br/ summary/view (accessed Jan. 15, 2017).

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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Waste “Waste Analysis at FaciliFacilities that Generate, Treat, Store, and Dispose of Hazardous Wastes  — Final,” Final,” www www.epa. .epa.gov/site gov/sites/produc s/production/le tion/les/2015s/2015-04/docum 04/documents/ ents/ tsdf-wap-guide-nal.pdf (Apr. 2015).

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Johnson, R. W., et al., “Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards,” CCPS, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ (Mar. 2003).

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National Fire Protection Agency, “NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion Investi gations,” NFPA, Quincy, MA (2017). Center for Chemical Process Safety, “Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, second edition,” CCPS, Wiley, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ (2007). U.S. Chemical Safety Board, “Case Study: Fire and Community Evacuation in Apex, North Carolina,” www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/ EQFinalReport.pdf, CSB, Washington, DC (Apr. 16, 2008). U.S. Chemical Safety Board, “Safety Advisory: Dangers of  Unspent Aircraft Oxygen Generators,” www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/ EQ_Safety_Advisory_Final.pdf, CSB, Washington, DC, (June 2007). Gray, B. F., and B. W. Halliburton, Halli burton,  “The Thermal Decomposi-

6.

7.

8.

9.

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13.

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